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Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
15-606
Ruling Below: Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 2015 CO 31 (Colo. 2015)
Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment. He filed a motion for
a new trial on the grounds that one of the jurors made racially charged statements. The motion
was denied, and he appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was insufficient to forego the rule excluding
examination into validity of jury verdict, and that said rule did not violate the right to a fair and
impartial jury.
Question Presented: Whether a no-impeachment rule constitutionally may bar evidence of
racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

Miguel Angel PENA–RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner
v.
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Colorado
Decided on May 18, 2015
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted]
CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the
Opinion of the Court.
This case involves the interplay between two
fundamental tenets of the justice system:
protecting the secrecy of jury deliberations
and ensuring a defendant's constitutional
right to an impartial jury. After entry of a
guilty verdict, defense counsel obtained juror
affidavits suggesting that one of the jurors
exhibited racial bias against the defendant
during deliberations. The trial court refused
to consider these affidavits, finding that
Colorado Rule of Evidence (“CRE”) 606(b)
barred their admission, and the court of
appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to
consider whether CRE 606(b) applies to such
affidavits and, if so, whether the Sixth

Amendment
admission.

nevertheless

requires

their

We hold that the affidavits regarding the
juror's biased statements fall within the broad
sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they do not
satisfy the rule's “extraneous prejudicial
information” exception. We further hold that
the trial court's application of CRE 606(b) did
not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I. Facts and Procedural History
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In May 2007, a man made sexual advances
toward two teenage girls in the bathroom of
the horse-racing facility where Petitioner
Miguel Angel Pena–Rodriguez worked.
Shortly thereafter, the girls identified
Petitioner as the assailant during a one-onone showup. The People subsequently
charged Petitioner with one count of sexual
assault on a child—victim less than fifteen;
one count of unlawful sexual contact—no
consent; and two counts of harassment—
strike, shove, or kick. After a preliminary
hearing, the court bound over the first count
as attempted sexual assault on a child—
victim less than fifteen.
At the start of a three-day trial, the jury venire
received a written questionnaire, which
inquired, “Is there anything about you that
you feel would make it difficult for you to be
a fair juror in this case?” During voir dire, the
judge asked the panel, “Do any of you have a
feeling for or against [Petitioner] or the
Prosecution?” Later, defense counsel asked
the venire whether “this is simply not a good
case for them to be a fair juror.” None of the
jurors subsequently impaneled answered any
of these questions so as to reflect racial bias.
The jury ultimately found Petitioner guilty of
the latter three counts but failed to reach a
verdict on the attempted sexual assault
charge.
Two weeks later, Petitioner filed a motion for
juror contact information, alleging that
“some members of the jury used ethnic slurs
in the course of deliberations.” The trial court
ordered Petitioner to submit affidavits
regarding the “ ‘who, what, when, and where’
of the allegations of juror misconduct.”
Petitioner's counsel subsequently filed an
affidavit averring that, shortly after entry of
the verdict, two jurors informed her that
“some of the other jurors expressed a bias
toward [Petitioner] and the alibi witness
because they were Hispanic.” The trial court

then authorized Petitioner's counsel to
contact these jurors, but only to secure
affidavits regarding their “best recollection of
exactly what each ‘biased’ juror stated about
[Petitioner] and/or the alibi witness.”
Thereafter, Petitioner submitted affidavits
from jurors M.M. and L.T., both of whom
alleged that juror H.C. made racially biased
statements during deliberations. According to
M.M., H.C. said that “I think he did it because
he's Mexican and Mexican men take
whatever they want.” She also stated that
H.C. “made other statements concerning
Mexican men being physically controlling of
women because they have a sense of
entitlement and think they can ‘do whatever
they want’ with women.” L.T. stated that
H.C. “believed that [Petitioner] was guilty
because in his experience as an ex-law
enforcement officer, Mexican men had a
bravado that caused them to believe they
could do whatever they wanted with
women.” L.T. further averred that H.C. “said
that where he used to patrol, nine times out of
ten Mexican men were guilty of being
aggressive toward women and young girls.”
Finally, L.T. stated that H.C. “said that he did
not think the alibi witness was credible
because, among other things, he was ‘an
illegal.’ ” Based on these affidavits,
Petitioner moved for a new trial. The trial
court denied the motion, finding that CRE
606(b) barred any inquiry into H.C.'s alleged
bias during deliberations.
Petitioner appealed, and a split division of the
court of appeals affirmed. The majority first
held that CRE 606(b) controlled the
admissibility of the jurors' affidavits and that
the affidavits did not satisfy the rule's
exceptions. The majority then rejected
Petitioner's
constitutional
challenge
regarding his Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury, holding that Petitioner
“waived his ability to challenge the verdict on
3

this basis by failing to sufficiently question
jurors about racial bias in voir dire Writing in
dissent, Judge Taubman did not disagree with
the majority's general analysis of CRE
606(b). He concluded, however, that CRE
606(b) was unconstitutional as applied. We
granted certiorari.

statement occurring during the course
of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any
other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing him to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or
concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith.”

II. Standard of Review
The general applicability of CRE 606(b) is a
question of law that we review de novo. But
whether the jury was influenced by
extraneous prejudicial information is a mixed
question of law and fact; we accept the trial
court's findings of fact absent an abuse of
discretion, but we review the court's legal
conclusions de novo.
III. Analysis
This case requires us to resolve whether CRE
606(b) bars admission of juror affidavits
suggesting that a juror made racially biased
statements during deliberations. To do so, we
first examine the plain language of the rule
and its overarching purpose. We then
conclude that such affidavits indeed
implicate CRE 606(b) and do not fall within
the
rule's
“extraneous
prejudicial
information” exception. Finally, we consider
whether the rule was unconstitutional as
applied to Petitioner, and we determine that
enforcing the rule did not violate his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.
A. CRE 606(b): Language and Purpose
CRE 606(b) is broad in scope: It precludes
courts from peering beyond the veil that
shrouds jury deliberations. Specifically, the
rule provides as follows:
“Upon an inquiry into the validity
of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or

CRE 606(b). The rule does, however,
enumerate three narrow exceptions: “[A]
juror may testify about (1) whether
extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jurors' attention,
(2) whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or
(3) whether there was a mistake in entering
the verdict onto the verdict form.” Colorado's
rule is virtually identical to its federal
counterpart.
CRE 606(b) effectuates three fundamental
purposes: It “promote[s] finality of verdicts,
shield[s] verdicts from impeachment, and
protect[s] jurors from harassment and
coercion.” Thus, the rule “strongly disfavors
any juror testimony impeaching a verdict.”
We have recognized that the federal rule is
equally forbidding.
With the proscriptive language and purpose
of CRE 606(b) in mind, we now consider
whether the rule operates to bar admission of
the juror affidavits in this case.
B. CRE 606(b) Bars Admission of the
Jurors' Affidavits
CRE 606(b)'s plain language clearly bars
admission of the jurors' affidavits in this case.
Absent narrow exceptions, the rule
unambiguously prohibits juror testimony “as
to any matter or statement occurring during
the course of the jury's deliberations.” Here,
Petitioner seeks to introduce juror testimony
precisely to that effect, as the affidavits from
4

both M.M. and L.T. pertain to statements
made during deliberations. Therefore, CRE
606(b) precludes their admission.
Petitioner argues that the affidavits do not
involve “an inquiry into the validity of [the]
verdict” as contemplated by CRE 606(b). In
Petitioner's view, the rule only applies to
statements regarding the jury's actual
deliberative process—that is, how the jury
reached its verdict—and not to evidence of a
particular juror's racial bias. To the extent
that we can even parse this semantic
distinction, we deem it immaterial. Petitioner
seeks to introduce evidence of comments
made during deliberations in order to nullify
the verdict and obtain a new trial. Such a
request necessarily involves an inquiry into
the verdict's validity, which is the very
inquiry that CRE 606(b) prevents.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly
rejected this exact argument in Warger v.
Shauers, determining that the rule “does not
focus on the means by which deliberations
evidence might be used to invalidate a
verdict.” Rather, the Court held that the rule
“simply applies ‘[d]uring an inquiry into the
validity of the verdict’—that is, during a
proceeding in which the verdict may be
rendered invalid.” Although the Court was
interpreting Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), we have
previously recognized that CRE 606(b) is
“[s]ubstantially similar to its federal
counterpart” and that we “look to the federal
authority for guidance in construing our
rule.” Thus, Warger forecloses Petitioner's
argument.
Petitioner next contends that, even if CRE
606(b) applies, the affidavits satisfy the rule's
exception for “extraneous prejudicial
information.” He is mistaken. That exception
pertains to “legal content and specific factual
information learned from outside the record
and relevant to the issues in a case.” But it is

“generally undisputed” that jurors “may
apply their general knowledge and everyday
experience when deciding cases.” Here, H.C.
did not perform any improper investigation
into Petitioner's case, nor did he introduce
evidence from outside the record into the jury
room. Rather, his alleged racial bias arose
from his personal beliefs and everyday
experience. Such bias, however ideologically
loathsome, is not “extraneous” as
contemplated by CRE 606(b).
And once again, Warger scuttles Petitioner's
claim. In that car-crash case, following a
verdict for the defendant, a juror reported that
another juror stated during deliberations that
her daughter had once caused a motor vehicle
accident and that “if her daughter had been
sued, it would have ruined her life.” The
Court held that such information “falls on the
‘internal’ side of the line: [The juror's]
daughter's accident may well have informed
her general views about negligence liability
for car crashes, but it did not provide either
her or the rest of the jury with any specific
knowledge regarding [the] collision.” The
Court noted that even if the juror's comments
would have warranted a challenge for cause,
that did not render them “extraneous,” as
otherwise “[t]he ‘extraneous' information
exception would swallow much of the rest of
Rule 606(b).” The same analysis applies
here.
Accordingly, we hold that the affidavits
concerning H.C.'s biased statements fall
within the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and
that they do not satisfy the rule's “extraneous
prejudicial information” exception. We now
address whether CRE 606(b) was
unconstitutional as applied in this case.
C. CRE 606(b) Was Not Unconstitutional
as Applied
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The Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides that “the accused shall
enjoy the right to ... an impartial jury.” The
question here is whether the trial court's
application of CRE 606(b), which functioned
to bar evidence of H.C.'s alleged racial bias
against Petitioner, violated his Sixth
Amendment right.
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a
similar—though not identical—issue in
Tanner v. United States. In that case,
following the verdict, a juror contacted
defense counsel and informed him that
several jurors had consumed alcohol on lunch
breaks during the trial and had slept through
afternoons, while another juror told counsel
that the jury was “one big party” and that
numerous jurors used alcohol and drugs.
After holding that Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)
barred this testimony, the Court considered
whether the Sixth Amendment nevertheless
required the trial court to examine such
evidence. The Court first declared that “longrecognized and very substantial concerns
support the protection of jury deliberations
from intrusive inquiry.” Turning to the
opposing scale, the Court reasoned that
“several aspects of the trial process” protect a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury. The Court identified four
specific safeguards: (1) voir dire; (2) the
court and counsel's ability to observe the jury
during trial; (3) jurors' opportunity to “report
inappropriate juror behavior to the court
before they render a verdict”; and (4) the
opportunity to use non-juror evidence of
misconduct to impeach the verdict following
trial. Id. The Court thus concluded that Rule
606(b) need not yield to Sixth Amendment
considerations.
Tanner, then, held that Rule 606(b) was not
unconstitutional as applied to cases of juror
incompetence. Last year, the Court in Warger
extended Tanner to cases of juror bias.

Relying on Tanner, the Court recognized that
“[e]ven if jurors lie in voir dire in a way that
conceals bias, juror impartiality is adequately
assured by the parties' ability to bring to the
court's attention any evidence of bias before
the verdict is rendered, and to employ
nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is
rendered.” Therefore, the Court held that
Tanner foreclosed “any claim that Rule
606(b) is unconstitutional in circumstances
such as these.”
Combined, Tanner and Warger stand for a
simple but crucial principle: Protecting the
secrecy of jury deliberations is of paramount
importance in our justice system. It was this
principle that animated the Court's refusals to
deem Rule 606(b) unconstitutional, despite
concerns regarding juror impropriety.
Indeed, although the Tanner Court
acknowledged that “postverdict investigation
into juror misconduct would in some
instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts
reached after irresponsible or improper juror
behavior,” it warned that “[i]t is not at all
clear ... that the jury system could survive
such efforts to perfect it.” As the Court
recognized, not only would authorizing postverdict investigations of jurors “seriously
disrupt the finality of the process,” but the
very potential for such investigations would
shatter public confidence in the fundamental
notion of trial by jury. In fact, the Court
perceived such a slippery slope as far back as
100 years ago:
“[L]et it once be established that
verdicts solemnly made and publicly
returned into court can be attacked
and set aside on the testimony of
those who took part in their
publication and all verdicts could be,
and many would be, followed by an
inquiry in the hope of discovering
something which might invalidate the
finding. Jurors would be harassed and
6

beset by the defeated party in an effort
to secure from them evidence of facts
which might establish misconduct
sufficient to set aside a verdict. If
evidence thus secured could be thus
used, the result would be to make
what was intended to be a private
deliberation, the constant subject of
public
investigation;
to
the
destruction of all frankness and
freedom
of
discussion
and
conference.”

protect a party's constitutional rights, even
when a biased juror lied during voir dire. The
same is true here. Other jurors could have
informed the court or counsel of H.C.'s
statements prior to delivering the verdict, and
any non-juror evidence of his bias remained
admissible
post-verdict.
That
these
safeguards did not benefit Petitioner in this
case does not nullify their validity, nor
Warger's clear endorsement of their ability to
protect a party's constitutional right to an
impartial jury.

Turning to the instant case, this case law
compels the conclusion that CRE 606(b) was
not unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner.
A contrary holding would ignore both the
policy underlying CRE 606(b) and the
unwavering Supreme Court precedent
emphasizing the magnitude of that policy. To
be sure, neither Tanner nor Warger involved
the exact issue of racial bias. But in
examining the Court's jurisprudence, we
cannot discern a dividing line between
different types of juror bias or misconduct,
whereby one form of partiality would
implicate a party's Sixth Amendment right
while another would not. To draw such a line
would not only violate the longstanding rule
of shielding private jury deliberations from
public view—not to mention incentivize
post-verdict harassment of jurors—but it
would also require trial courts to make
arbitrary judgments that hinge on the severity
of a particular juror's impropriety or the
intensity of his bias. We decline to sanction
such a haphazard process.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court's application of CRE 606(b) to bar
admission of the jurors' affidavits did not
violate Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right.

Admittedly, bias is less readily visible than
intoxication, meaning the second Tanner
protection—the ability of the court to observe
the jury's behavior during trial—carries less
force in such cases. But that did not prevent
the Warger Court from deeming the
remaining Tanner safeguards sufficient to

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, dissenting.

IV. Conclusion
CRE 606(b) operates to ensure that the
privacy of jury deliberations remains
sacrosanct. The rule, and the policy it
buttresses, is squarely on point in this case.
We thus hold that the jurors' affidavits
regarding H.C.'s biased statements fall within
the broad sweep of CRE 606(b) and that they
do not satisfy the rule's “extraneous
prejudicial information” exception. We
further hold that the trial court's application
of CRE 606(b) did not violate Petitioner's
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
court of appeals.
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ dissents, and
JUSTICE EID and JUSTICE HOOD join
in the dissent.

I agree with the majority that CRE 606(b)
bars admission of the post-verdict affidavits
in this case. By its terms, that rule of evidence
precludes any “inquiry into the validity of a
verdict” based on juror testimony regarding
7

statements made during jury deliberations,
and Pena–Rodriguez's motion for a new trial
“plainly entail[ed] an inquiry into the validity
of the verdict,” even if it questioned the jury's
impartiality and not its thought processes. I
also agree that evidence of a juror's personal
bias does not qualify as “extraneous
prejudicial information” for purposes of the
exception in CRE 606(b)(1). Nevertheless, I
respectfully dissent because, in my view,
Rule 606(b) “cannot be applied so inflexibly
as to bar juror testimony in those rare and
grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic
bias during jury deliberations implicate a
defendant's right to due process and an
impartial jury.” Racial bias is detestable in
any context, but in our criminal justice
system it is especially pernicious. I would
hold that where, as here, evidence comes to
light that a juror specifically relied on racial
bias to find the defendant guilty, CRE 606(b)
must yield to the defendant's constitutional
right to an impartial jury.
By foreclosing consideration of the evidence
of racial bias alleged in this case, the majority
elevates general policy interests in the
finality of verdicts and in avoiding the
potential embarrassment of a juror over the
defendant's fundamental constitutional right
to a fair trial. Although the majority believes
that this result is required to preserve public
confidence in our jury trial system, in my
view, it has precisely the opposite effect.
“The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed
by both the Sixth Amendment, made
applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and by principles of
due process.” Our state constitution likewise
guarantees this right. Indeed, this court has
observed that “[a]n impartial jury is a
fundamental element of the constitutional
right to a fair trial.” Racial discrimination in
our jury trial system “not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but

is at war with our basic concepts of a
democratic society and a representative
government.” Importantly, the harm caused
by such discrimination is “ ‘not limited to the
defendant—there is injury to the jury system,
to the law as an institution, to the community
at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected
in the processes of our courts.’ ”
In its recent discussion of Fed. R. Evid.
606(b) in Warger, the United States Supreme
Court observed that certain features built into
the jury system ordinarily suffice to expose
juror bias before the jury renders a verdict.
Warger involved a negligence action arising
out of a motor vehicle accident. In that case,
a juror allegedly stated during deliberations
that her daughter had been at fault in a motor
vehicle collision in which a man died and that
if her daughter had been sued, it would have
ruined her life. Warger argued in a motion for
a new trial that this statement revealed that
the juror had lied during voir dire about her
impartiality and her ability to award
damages. The Court concluded that Fed. R.
Evid. 606(b) barred consideration of this
evidence. It also concluded that its decision
in Tanner foreclosed Warger's claim that
Rule 606(b) was unconstitutional as applied
to the circumstances of that case. In so doing,
however, the Court expressly acknowledged
that “[t]here may be cases of juror bias so
extreme that, almost by definition, the jury
trial right has been abridged,” and declined to
consider whether “the usual safeguards are or
are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the
[jury] process” under such circumstances. In
my view, this is that exceptional case.
According to the two juror affidavits
obtained by Pena–Rodriguez's counsel, Juror
H.C. made several statements during jury
deliberations indicating that he relied on
racial bias to determine Pena–Rodriguez's
guilt:
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• Pena–Rodriguez “did it because he's
Mexican and Mexican men take
whatever they want.”
• Mexican men are physically
controlling of women because they
have a sense of entitlement and think
they can “do whatever they want”
with women.
• Pena–Rodriguez “was guilty
because, in [Juror H.C.'s] experience
as an ex-law enforcement officer,
Mexican men had a bravado that
caused them to believe they could do
whatever they wanted with women.”
• Where Juror H.C. used to patrol,
“nine times out of ten Mexican men
were guilty of being aggressive
toward women and young girls.”
• Pena–Rodriguez's alibi witness was
not credible because, among other
things, he was “an illegal.”
In my view, the circumstances of this case
reveal that the safeguards identified in
Tanner are not always adequate to protect a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to an
impartial jury. Unlike the comment in
Warger, Juror H.C.'s multiple statements in
this case evince racial bias toward a criminal
defendant. And, importantly, these alleged
statements reveal Juror H.C.'s inability to
decide impartially the crucial issue in this
case: whether Pena–Rodriguez committed
the charged crimes, or whether he instead had
a credible alibi.
The majority claims to adhere to “the
unmistakable trend” in United States
Supreme Court case law “refusing to deem
Rule 606(b) unconstitutional.” Yet the
Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged
the possibility that juror bias may be so

“extreme” as to call into question the
adequacy of the usual safeguards to protect
the integrity of the process. In my view,
where, as here, it appears that a juror
specifically relied on racial bias to find the
defendant guilty, Rule 606(b) must yield to a
defendant's constitutional right to an
impartial jury, in that a trial court must be
afforded the discretion to explore the validity
of such allegations in the context of a motion
for a new trial.
The question whether evidence of a juror's
racial bias should be admissible in some
cases, notwithstanding Rule 606(b), is hardly
uncharted territory. In Villar, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
considered whether the usual Tanner
safeguards suffice to protect a defendant's
right to an impartial jury where racial or
ethnic bias is alleged, as opposed to the type
of juror misconduct at issue in Tanner. In
Villar, a juror emailed defense counsel
following the verdict to report that another
juror said, “I guess we're profiling, but
[Hispanics] cause all the trouble.” Similarly,
in Kittle v. United States, a juror wrote to the
judge post-verdict alleging that some jurors
felt that “all ‘blacks' are guilty.” Like the
present case, both Villar and Kittle involved
racially motivated statements directly tied to
the defendant's guilt.
In Villar, the First Circuit concluded that “the
four protections relied on by the Tanner
Court do not provide adequate safeguards in
the context of racially and ethnically biased
comments made during deliberations.”
Although the Tanner safeguards serve to
protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial, they focus on juror misconduct.
In my view, they are not always adequate to
uncover racial bias before the jury renders its
verdict.
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First, as the majority acknowledges, defense
attorneys may, for legitimate tactical reasons,
choose not to question jurors about racial bias
during voir dire and instead attempt to root
out prejudice through more generalized
questioning. And even when defense
attorneys are willing to probe this sensitive
topic directly, jurors may be reluctant to
admit racial bias during voir dire. Second,
jurors might not report racial comments made
during deliberations before the verdict
because they are unwilling to confront their
fellow jurors, or because they believe they
cannot report such comments before
rendering a verdict, or because they are
unaware that post-verdict testimony is
putatively inadmissible. Third, observations
of the jury by counsel and the court during
trial are generally unlikely to uncover racial
bias. And fourth, non-jurors cannot report
racially biased statements made during
deliberations to which they obviously do not
have access. For all these reasons, the Tanner
protections do not always provide adequate
safeguards of a defendant's right to an
impartial jury.
In my view, the trial court should have
discretion in some circumstances to admit
evidence of racially biased statements made
during juror deliberations. As the Villar court
noted, the trial judge will often be in the best
position to determine whether an inquiry is
necessary to vindicate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury. Thus,
the Villar court remanded that case to the trial
court to decide whether the juror's report
warranted further inquiry.
Should the trial court conclude that further
inquiry is appropriate, it must then determine
whether a juror was actually biased. If such a
juror sat on the case, the defendant is entitled
to a new trial without having to establish that
the juror's bias affected the verdict. Only if
the defendant fails to establish that a juror

was actually biased must he show that the
“statements so infected the deliberative
process with racially or ethnically charged
language or stereotypes that it prejudiced the
defendant's right to have his guilt decided by
an impartial jury on the evidence admitted at
trial.” Therefore, contrary to the People's
argument, Pena–Rodriguez may be entitled
to a new trial regardless of the effect of Juror
H.C.'s comments on the verdict.
The majority admits that Tanner did not
implicate “the exact issue of racial bias” but
summarily concludes: “[W]e cannot discern
a dividing line between different types of
juror bias or misconduct.” I disagree. I would
limit our holding in this case to post-verdict
evidence of racial or ethnic bias that goes
directly to the issue of the defendant's guilt.
Racial bias differs from other forms of bias in
that it compromises institutional legitimacy.
A holding limited to such circumstances
would reflect and respond to a real-world
threat to the integrity of the jury trial right.
Furthermore, the majority overstates its
concerns about the potential demise of the
jury system should the allegations in this case
be admissible in a motion for a new trial. The
majority reasons that “the secrecy of jury
deliberations is of paramount importance in
our justice system,” yet fails to acknowledge
that jurors are free to discuss deliberations
publicly. Concerns about “post-verdict
harassment of jurors,” are similarly
misplaced: Even commentators critical of
allowing post-verdict evidence of juror bias
have observed that the exception in Rule
606(b)(1) for extraneous information already
creates an incentive for the losing party to
contact jurors after a verdict has been
rendered. The majority's broader fear that the
jury system may not survive absent
unbending application of Rule 606(b), has
proven groundless; the jury system has not
collapsed in jurisdictions where trial courts
10

have discretion, in rare circumstances, to
allow post-verdict evidence of racial bias.
The policies of finality and juror privacy that
underlie CRE 606(b) are well founded.
Moreover, not every stray comment
reflecting a racial stereotype warrants a
hearing. However, this case presents the
extreme exception contemplated in Warger.
The multiple comments alleged to have been
made in this case were heard by other jurors
and were directly tied to the determination of
the defendant's guilt. According to the two
post-verdict affidavits, Juror H.C. expressed
in various ways that Pena–Rodriguez “did it
because he's Mexican.” I simply cannot agree

with the majority that “[p]rotecting the
secrecy of jury deliberations” is of such
“paramount importance in our justice
system,” that it must trump a defendant's
opportunity to vindicate his fundamental
constitutional right to an impartial jury
untainted by the influence of racial bias. In
my view, to foreclose consideration of the
allegations presented here is precisely what
“shatter[s] public confidence in the
fundamental notion of trial by jury.”
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE EID
and JUSTICE HOOD join in this dissent.
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“Supreme Court to hear case of alleged racial bias by juror”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
April 4, 2016

The Supreme Court on Monday said it will
consider a case of alleged racial bias by a
juror so severe that it may merit breaching the
confidential nature of jury deliberations.
In most instances, state and federal laws
prohibit defendants from challenging a jury’s
verdict by introducing testimony about
statements made during deliberations. But
lawyers for a Colorado man persuaded the
court to review whether comments made by a
juror in his case were so discriminatory as to
violate the defendant’s right to an impartial
jury.
A juror in Miguel Angel Peña Rodriguez’s
sexual assault trial told other jurors that the
defendant was guilty “because he’s Mexican
and Mexican men take whatever they want.”
The juror, identified in court papers as H.C.,
said it was his experience in law enforcement
that “nine times out of 10 Mexican men were
guilty of being aggressive toward women and
young girls.”
The Supreme Court in 2014 unanimously
turned aside a lawsuit that sought to
challenge “no impeachment” rules that bar
using jury deliberations as evidence in
seeking a new trial. But in a footnote, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor noted that case did not
involve charges of racial discrimination.

“There may be cases of juror bias so extreme
that, almost by definition, the jury trial right
has been abridged,” Sotomayor wrote. “If
and when such a case arises, the court can
consider whether the usual safeguards are or
are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the
process.”
Peña Rodriguez, who is represented by
Jeffrey L. Fisher of the Stanford Law School
Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, said his
case presented that opportunity.
“When racial prejudice infects a jury’s
decision whether to convict, the integrity of
the criminal justice system is brought into
direct question,” Fisher wrote. Groups such
as the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund filed briefs urging the court
to take the case.
Colorado responded that its no-impeachment
rule had three goals: to promote finality of
verdicts, shield verdicts from impeachment,
and protect jurors from harassment and
coercion. Proper questioning of potential
jurors before the trial protects against bias, it
said.
The case stems from an incident at Arapahoe
Race Track in 2007. Peña Rodriguez was a
horse keeper at the track, where three teenage
sisters went into a restroom. A man entered
12

behind them and asked whether they wanted
to drink beer and “party.”
One girl left before the man turned out the
lights and groped the others. They escaped
and went to their father, who also worked at
the track. Eventually they identified Peña
Rodriguez as the man in the bathroom.
The jury deliberated for 12 hours and could
not reach a verdict on a felony count of
attempted sexual assault. It convicted Peña
Rodriguez of three misdemeanors: one count
of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of
harassment. He was sentenced to probation
and required to register as a sex offender.

After the verdict, two jurors went to defense
attorneys to tell them what juror H.C. had
allegedly said. Peña Rodriguez tried to use
the statements to overturn the verdicts, but
lower courts turned him down. The Colorado
Supreme Court ruled 4 to 3 that the state’s noimpeachment rule barred the statements.
Peña Rodriguez’s petition said that courts
across the country are divided on the issue
and that only the Supreme Court could decide
whether such incidents violate the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury.
The case, Peña Rodriguez v. Colorado, will
be argued in the term that begins in October.
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“Is Evidence of Juror Bias in Deliberations Admissible? Supreme Court
to Decide”
Lexology
Shawn S. Ledingham, Jr.
April 21, 2016

What happens in the jury room, stays in the
jury room. Except when it doesn’t. Earlier
this month, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
the appeal of a Colorado man whose counsel
learned, after the guilty verdict was rendered,
that one of the jurors had made statements in
deliberation that the defendant must be guilty
and his alibi witness could not be trusted,
because both men were Hispanic. The case,
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, pits two
fundamental aspects of jury trials against
each other: the inadmissibility of evidence
about what was said or done during jury
deliberations versus the right to a fair trial by
unbiased jurors. The Supreme Court’s ruling
could open up jury verdicts to possible
challenge when those verdicts appear to be
the result of racial or other bias.
Jury Deliberations – Not a Secret, but not
Admissible
Strictly speaking, jury deliberations are not
always secret. In fact, a common feature of
jury trials in many jurisdictions is the postverdict interview, where lawyers seize the
opportunity to discuss the case directly with
the recently discharged jurors before they
leave the courthouse. These interviews can be
an incredibly valuable tool for trial lawyers.
They can reveal which arguments resonate

and which don’t, for appeal and potential
retrial. They can serve as a gut check for
even the most seasoned trial lawyer, and they
can provide helpful critiques for younger
lawyers developing their trial presentation
skills. But, with very limited exceptions,
statements made by a juror after she has been
discharged cannot be used as evidence to try
to upset the verdict.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606 says that courts
considering whether to overturn a jury
verdict may not hear live testimony from a
juror, nor receive a juror’s affidavit or any
other evidence of a juror’s statements, on
anything that was said or done during jury
deliberations. There are a few exceptions,
such as when a juror testifies that information
that was not in evidence was given to the jury
(like Henry Fonda pulling out the second
knife in 12 Angry Men) or that there has been
some sort of improper outside influence used
against a juror (like the mob’s threat to kill
Demi Moore’s son in The Juror). But other
than in very narrow circumstances, it doesn’t
matter what a juror reports happened during
deliberations; it can’t be used to overturn the
verdict.
Peña-Rodriguez – If Bias Comes out After
Trial, Can You Do Anything About it?
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In granting certiorari in Peña-Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court appears to be entertaining the
possibility of opening up another exception
to this evidentiary rule. Miguel PeñaRodriguez was convicted of three
misdemeanor counts for the alleged sexual
harassment and groping of two teenage girls
at a horse track where he worked. The
defense maintained that the case was one of
mistaken identity. Somebody had assaulted
the girls, they argued, but it wasn’t PeñaRodriguez because he had been in a barn in a
different part of the track facility during the
attack. An alibi witness produced by the
defense corroborated the defendant’s story.

denied the motion, under Colorado’s
analogue to FRE 606, because the jurors’
testimony could not serve as a basis for
overturning the verdict. This holding was
affirmed on appeal, ultimately by the
Colorado Supreme Court. Peña-Rodriguez’s
lawyers sought review from the U.S.
Supreme Court, challenging the state
evidentiary rule under the Sixth Amendment
(applicable to state law under the Fourteenth
Amendment). The Supreme Court accepted
cert earlier this month.

After the verdict, Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer
was told by two of the jurors that another
juror allegedly made racist statements during
deliberations regarding the defendant’s guilt
and impugning the credibility of his alibi
witness, including:

The Supreme Court must decide whether the
Constitutional right to an impartial jury
trumps the exclusionary rule of evidence. At
issue is the balance between the need for
finality of jury verdicts, on the one hand, and
the right to a fair trial, on the other.
Overlaying this balancing is the additional
concern — clearly on the minds of the
Colorado Supreme Court justices when they
denied Peña‑ Rodriguez’s appeal — that the
lawyers on the losing side of a jury trial might
harass and coerce jurors in an attempt to drum
up a basis for overturning the verdict. Of
course, any ancillary proceeding involving
evidence from the jury deliberations would
also presumably require cross-examination
of the jurors to probe the jurors’ credibility
and reliability.

-“I think he did it because he’s
Mexican and Mexican men take
whatever they want.”
-“Mexican men [have] a bravado that
cause[] them to believe they could do
whatever they wanted with women.”
-“[N]ine times out of ten Mexican
men were guilty of being aggressive
toward women and young girls.”
-“[T]he alibi witness [wasn’t]
credible because, among other things,
he was an illegal.”
After defense counsel learned of these
statements and others like them, the defense
obtained sworn affidavits from both jurors
and moved for a new trial. The trial court

What to Watch for – Balancing of Two
Fundamental Tenets of Jury Trials

While the Supreme Court’s decision will
likely focus on the narrow issue of racial
prejudice in criminal trials, it has the
potential of shifting this balance more
broadly and opening up, just a tiny bit more,
the shroud surrounding the jury room.

15

“Court to rule on challenge to juror bias”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
April 4, 2016

The Supreme Court on Monday took on a
long-standing dispute over the privacy of jury
deliberations, agreeing to decide whether
jurors can be questioned after a trial is over
about one of their colleagues’ support for a
guilty verdict because of the defendant’s
racial or ethnic identity. The case of PenaRodriguez v. Colorado will be argued and
decided in the Court’s next Term, starting in
October.
Most states, along with the federal courts,
have rules that bar the questioning of jurors
about claims that one of the members of their
panel engaged in misconduct while the jurors
were making up their minds. The idea behind
such rules is that jurors should be able to
ponder verdicts without worrying about
being second-guessed later about the
decisions they made, and how those were
made. The specific question the Justices will
decide is when the enforcement of that rule
would interfere with the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury.
The case grows out of the prosecution of an
Aurora, Colo., racetrack worker, Miguel
Angel Pena-Rodriguez, for alleged sexual
harassment of two teen-aged girls. He was
found guilty of three misdemeanor charges,
sentenced to two years on probation, and
required to register as a sex offender. (A

native of Mexico, Pena-Rodriguez entered
the United States as a child; his formal
immigration status is not clarified in the
case.)
After the trial was over, two jurors told
defense lawyers that one of the jurors had
made a number of racist comments about
Mexicans during the jury deliberations.
Among other points, that juror was said to
have told colleagues that Pena-Rodriguez had
committed the crime because he was a
Mexican “and Mexican men take whatever
they want,” that Mexican men had “a bravado
that caused them to believe they could do
whatever they wanted with women,” and that
Mexican men were “physically controlling of
women.” That juror, a former police officer,
allegedly made similar comments based on
his experience with Mexican men. The same
juror allegedly described a witness, who also
was Hispanic, as someone who could not be
believed because he was “an illegal.”
Before the trial, the judge had told defense
lawyers that, sometimes, jurors in the court in
Colorado often had voiced their dislike of
individuals who had entered the U.S.
illegally. Defense lawyers, however, did not
ask any of the potential jurors about that
possibility.
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In taking the case on to the Supreme Court,
lawyers for Pena-Rodriguez argued that
federal and state courts are split on when a
rule against questioning jurors after a trial
must be set aside to allow an inquiry into
claims of alleged racial bias during
deliberations.

These were attempts to get the Court to spell
out further new limits on class-action
lawsuits, in the wake of its recent ruling in the
case of Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo.

In its orders on Monday, the Court accepted
for review only the Pena-Rodriguez case. In
other actions, it turned down several new
cases seeking clarification of whether federal
courts have the authority to approve a lawsuit
in the form of a class action if some of those
involved in the case had not suffered any of
the harm claimed in the case.
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“Jury Room Racism Is Protected. It Shouldn't Be.”
Bloomberg View
Noah Feldman
April 5, 2016

Law and tradition say that a jury verdict
shouldn't be overturned on the basis of
something jurors say in their deliberations, no
matter how ignorant or offensive.

probably a coin -- and agreed to decide the
case based on the toss. Until then, courts had
generally considered accounts of juror
misbehavior.

But what if there’s strong evidence that the
jury deliberations were racially biased? Does
the defendant’s right to a fair trial supersede
the tradition of letting the verdict stand? The
Supreme Court has agreed to hear this
fascinating question in a sexual assault case
where one juror, a former cop, told the others
that Mexican men "do whatever they want"
with women.

Mansfield changed the rule. He argued that
the jurors shouldn't be permitted to implicate
themselves in the serious crime of breaking
their oaths of conduct. If the jury’s
misconduct were to be considered, he
concluded, "the Court must derive their
knowledge from some other source: such as
from some person having seen the transaction
through a window, or by some such other
means."

Odds are that the court will decide that the
sanctity of the jury room trumps racial
fairness – but it’s far from clear that would be
the right result.
Most traditions are invented. What’s
fascinating about the tradition of refusing to
consider post-trial stories by jurors of their
own misconduct is that we know exactly
when it was invented, and by whom. The year
was 1785 and the inventor was Lord
Mansfield, generally considered the greatest
common law judge in English legal history,
who loved to make up efficient new rules.
In the case of Vaise v. Delaval, the jurors,
unable to reach a verdict, had "tossed up" –

The rule probably relied on a then-prevalent
doctrine that a witness would not be heard to
allege his own wrongdoing. Today we allow
testimony against one's own interests, so
Mansfield’s original rationale doesn’t apply.
But within a few decades, Mansfield’s rule
had taken root for a different, more practical
reason: It assures the finality of verdicts. If
decisions could be overturned by jurors’
testimony about what happened in the jury
room, the incentive to reopen verdicts would
be great, and it would be hard to know when,
exactly, the result would stick.1
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The Supreme Court relied on the finality
rationale in a 1915 case. It repeated it in a
2014 decision, Warger v. Shauers, in which
it refused to allow post-trial affidavits
showing that a juror had lied during jury
selection questioning and told other jurors
that her daughter had been in a car accident
and that if she'd been sued, "it would have
ruined her life."
Federal evidence law, copied by most states,
preserves the rule with exceptions for
extraneous prejudicial information, improper
outside influence or a mistake on the jury
form. The extraneous information is usually
held to include specific facts about the case,
not jurors’ general knowledge – or their
personal biases.
The case that the court will hear now, PenaRodriguez v. Colorado, involved post-trial
testimony that one juror’s racial bias may
have affected the verdict. The defendant in
the case, Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez, was
charged with sexual assault for accosting two
girls, one under 15, in the bathroom of a
horse-racing facility.
According to more than one juror affidavit,
one of the jurors, a former law-enforcement
officer, told the others that the defendant "did
it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men
take whatever they want." He made more
prejudicial statements in the same vein,
adding that an alibi witness shouldn’t be
believed because he "was an illegal" -- a
claim not supported in the trial record.

Monica Márquez, joined by two others, did
not.
Márquez, a respected judge (I went to law
school with her), dissented to say that the
Sixth Amendment2 right to a fair trial, as well
as the guarantee of due process, trumped the
rule of evidence. She pointed out that in its
2014 opinion, the Supreme Court said in a
footnote, "There may be cases of juror bias so
extreme that, almost by definition, the jury
trial right has been abridged.” This, said
Márquez, was exactly such a case.
The fact that the court took the case suggests
that it’s at least possible that it thinks
Márquez may be right. It seems more likely
that the court will rely on finality once more,
as it did in 2014. Jurors have all kinds of
biases, and allowing testimony about them
could indeed threaten the finality of trials.
But the court should consider that the federal
rules already allow exceptions from finality
for extraneous information. And it should
keep in mind that the Mansfield rule doesn’t
rest on very strong internal logic. Given
these, it makes some sense to treat the
constitutional interest in a fair trial as
paramount. Jurors may be biased, but if they
express overt racism in the jury room, that
should be admissible as evidence that their
verdict was unconstitutional.

The justices of the Colorado Supreme Court
all agreed that the juror affidavits were
inadmissible. But while the majority
considered that the end of the matter, Justice
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